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Abstract
Fifty years ago there were few mathematical models of program semantics, perhaps none. Now there is
probably a new one created every day. How do we do it? How should we do it?
In our community we understand the utility of the reﬁnement order, and we believe that each fresh semantics
should come equipped with one. Although reﬁnement’s general principles are well understood, it is still not
so easy to see just what the order should be in any particular case. Thus one of the things we should do is
be clear about what the criteria really are for reﬁnement orders.
Recently invented is the Shadow Semantics for non-interference -style security of sequential programs includ-
ing a reﬁnement order. Using that as an example, I give here a rational reconstruction of how a reﬁnement
order can be “brewed-up” for a speciﬁc purpose; the aim of the exercise is to extract general lessons about
how that can be done.
Keywords: The Shadow, reﬁnement, security, ignorance, semantics, non-interference, reﬁnement paradox,
compositionality, full abstraction.
1 Introduction: Reﬁnement and implication
Reﬁnement S  I holds by deﬁnition just when “Speciﬁcation S has good property
G ” implies “Implementation has property G ” or, equivalently, “I has bad property
B” implies “S has property B,” with the implications holding in each case for all
good/bad properties of a certain kind decided beforehand. Thus reﬁnement is just
implication, either forward of reverse: the problem is only in deciding “what kind of
properties, exactly?” What G’s and/or B’s do we consider? And how do we decide
whether or not a speciﬁcation or implementation has such a property?
The initial step is subjective, determined by the phenomena to be studied: func-
tional behaviour, probability, security, concurrency. . . But that’s only a beginning;
and the aim of this note is to show by example what technical tools and points of
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view contribute to “brewing-up” a fully developed reﬁnement order once that ﬁrst
step has been taken.
Inherited from implication are reﬁnement’s partial-order characteristics: reﬂex-
ivity, antisymmetry and transitivity. Further properties are monotonicity and com-
positionality. The practical signiﬁcance of transitivity is well known, that if you
reﬁne a program today, and reﬁne it further tomorrow and again the day after,
then by the weekend you still have a reﬁnement of what you started with. This is
one of the reasons we insist that it be a partial order. Reﬂexivity is trivial, since any
program S or I has all the properties of itself, whether good or bad. Antisymmetry
we return to later (as full abstraction).
Monotonicity is actually a property of functions, rather than of partial orders:
we say that f is monotonic with respect to  just when x  x′ implies f.x  f.x′
for all x, x′ . 3 In the space of programs (i.e. of their texts) monotonicity means
that S  I implies C(S)  C(I) for all program-contexts C. In the space of program
meanings, we would say that the function f is the denotation of a program context
(corresponding to C(·)), and the argument x ﬁlls the “hole” (·) in the context with
the meaning of a program (such as S or I). Either way, the practical signiﬁcance
of monotonicity is that if you reﬁne your own small part (from x to x′) of a big
program (f.x) then what you get (f.x′) has not destroyed the work (f) of all your
colleagues: it’s still a reﬁnement overall.
Compositionality is in the broader community more well known than monotonic-
ity, but it is related: it means that the meaning of a compound is determined by
the meanings of its components. If we use the conventional denotational brack-
ets [[·]] to convert syntax to semantics, compositionality thus means that whenever
[[P ]] = [[Q]] we have [[C(P )]] = [[C(Q)]] also. But monotonicity (in its second, semantic
form) already says that [[P ]]  [[Q]] gives us [[C]].[[P ]]  [[C]].[[Q]], and vice versa, so
that compositionality follows from reﬁnement’s other two partial-order properties
of reﬂexivity and anti-symmetry. 4
The above properties are basic guidelines for how reﬁnement orders should be-
have; but the underlying issue is not so much the order but the semantics it sits in.
That in turn depends crucially on the observations you allow yourself to make or
–to put it another way– the observations you consider suﬃciently important to be
worth paying for. 5
A popular starting point for ﬁnding the semantic sweet-spot in a new system is
to conduct thought experiments between pairs of programs, asking whether or not
they should be distinguished (are worth distinguishing) — with that being done
before the semantics is set in concrete.
With our background of course we would rather ask the question whether one
3 We write f.x for function f applied to argument x. It reduces the number of parentheses needed in
complicated expressions.
4 Actually it follows anyway from the fact that [[C]] is meaningful on its own, i.e. is actuall some function
f that can be applied to program meanings.
5 The currency could be real money –the salary of the RA who makes the semantics for you– or it could
be more abstractly the time wasted down the decades with an observational repertoire that turns out to be
pointlessly complex. On the other hand, it could also be the lives lost if that repertoire is too simple.
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program is reﬁned by another; and that is where we will begin in §2 immediately
following. Where we will end –some time later– is the reﬁnement order given by (6)
below. The “rational reconstruction” of the path, from beginning to end, will try
to show by example the kinds of issues that are encountered when designing any
reﬁnement order, and how they can be dealt with.
The context for our case study will be the recently developed Shadow Semantics
for non-interference style security of sequential programs. Although sequential-
program semantics [5,10,4], reﬁnement [8,12,2,1,15] and the idea of non-interference
-style security [6] were all established long ago, what impeded their being brought
together was the Reﬁnement Paradox [11]. In a simple form it is this:
If a secret can have two values then it is a reﬁnement (classically) to replace that
by a secret which can have only one value: demonic nondeterminism has been
reduced. Yet that reﬁnement has destroyed the security property: something that
can have only one value is no longer a secret.
With that in mind, we now turn to our experiments.
2 Gedanken Experiments
“The common goal of a thought experiment is to explore the potential consequences
of the principle in question.” 6
For us, the principle in question is that the secure reﬁnement that we are trying
to deﬁne/discover should have the characteristics necessary for software develop-
ment to be practical. It’s important to carry out our experiments with respect to
those principles before committing to a detailed design of the semantics and its ac-
companying reﬁnement relation: not only will the experiments’ outcomes help you
to formulate your design; but –with luck– they will prevent you at an early stage
from constructing a bad design which, because it took so much hard work, you will
then be reluctant to throw away.
Here are some of the principles (among others [18]):
• Reﬁnement is monotonic.
• All speciﬁc classical reﬁnements remain valid if they do not involve security.
• All general “structural” classical reﬁnements remain valid, whether they involve
security or not.
• Expressions equal in a context can be exchanged without eﬀect (referential trans-
parency).
These characteristics have some surprising consequences. Here are just two:
Suppose that our program has just two variables v, h over {0, 1} with v visible
and h hidden. Does program v:=h; v:= 0 reveal h to an observer? We reason
(v:=h; v:= 0); (v:= 0  v:= 1)
6 This is taken from the Wikipedia entry for “Gedanken experiments.”
C. Morgan / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 259 (2009) 123–141 125
= v:=h; (v:= 0; (v:= 0  v:= 1)) “structural equality: associativity”
= v:=h; (v:= 0  v:= 1) “classical equality not involving security”
 v:=h; skip “classical reﬁnement; monotonicity”
= v:=h , “structural equality: skip is the identity”
so that since the implementation v:=h doesn’t conceal h –which we regard as a bad
property– we conclude that v:=h; v:= 0; (v:= 0v:= 1), the speciﬁcation, must also
have failed to do so. We must therefore give our semantics the property of perfect
recall [7].
Another experiment is whether program h:= 0  h:= 1 reveals h. We reason
(h:= 0  h:= 1); (v:= 0  v:= 1)
= “structural equality: distribution  and ;”
(h:= 0; (v:= 0  v:= 1))  (h:= 1; (v:= 0  v:= 1))
 (h:= 0; v:= 0)  (h:= 1; v:= 1) “classical reﬁnement; monotonicity”
= (h:= 0; v:=h)  (h:= 1; v:=h) “referential transparency”
= (h:= 0  h:= 1); v:=h . “reverse above steps”
From that we see that we can, by reﬁnement, introduce a statement that reveals
h explicitly. Our model must therefore allow the adversary to observe the program
ﬂow, because that is the only way operationally he could have discovered h in this
case. Similar reasoning shows that
if E then skip else skip ﬁ
reveals the Boolean value E.
Our experiments tell us that our semantics –whatever it turns out to be– should
be rich enough to record past values of visible variables and of the program counter.
Similar experiments give further insights, and the more time spent here the better
oﬀ we are likely to be later: think of this as the “requirements capture” phase of
our project to build a semantics.
Now we move to some initial design.
3 The execution model: sequences of program-states
We continue with just two variables v, h with v visible and h hidden; yet the exper-
iments above have already suggested what these two terms “visible” and “hidden”
should mean if we are going to allow reﬁnement and non-interference -style security
to coe¨xist:
An attacker executes our program and strives to discover the ﬁnal value of the
hidden variable h. In doing so he uses a run-time debugger, setting breakpoints
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and single-stepping as he wishes: whenever the program is paused for inspection,
the exact point in the source code is indicated, and thus as well as the names of
all variables in scope (including the hidden ones).
• The atomicity of the program commands determines the points at which break-
points can be inserted or (equivalently) the size of single-steps the attacker can
instruct the debugger to take. Pauses are allowed only between atoms, and
never within them.
• The visibility of the program variables determines whether the debugger re-
veals variable values for inspection. When execution is paused, hovering the
cursor over an in-scope visible-declared variable reveals its value; hovering over
a hidden-declared value reveals nothing.
We provide the raw material for modelling these attack-capabilities by record-
ing entire traces of a program’s execution, each trace being a sequence of triples
comprising values of the visible variable v, the hidden variable h and the program
counter p. The program’s meaning, based on an initial state (v0, h0, p0), is then a
set of (potential) traces of (v, h, p)-triples, with the multiplicity of traces (if present)
being due to nondeterminism in the program text.
The attacker’s capabilities are then expressible in terms of an equivalence rela-
tion on these traces. 7
4 Equivalence of traces expresses the attacker’s capa-
bilities
Again appealing to the Gedanken Experiments §2, we consider two traces to be
equivalent as follows. Suppose the types of v, h, p are V,H,P resp., so that the type
of a trace t:T is the set of sequences seq.(V×H×P); for such a t, write v.t,h.t,p.t
for the projections onto types seq.V, seq.H and seq.P resp.
Then we say two traces t{1,2} are equivalent, writing t1∼t2, just when we have
both v.t1=v.t2 and p.t1=p.t2, that is when they have the same sequence of v’s (since
we allow perfect recall) and the same sequence of p’s (since we allow observation
of the program ﬂow). Since a trace includes its ﬁnal element, this implies that
equivalent traces have reached the same point in the program (in fact, by the same
route), and have the same value of v at that point. They do not have to have the
same sequence of h’s or indeed even the same ﬁnal h, since the attacker cannot
observe that.
The attacker’s capabilities are then that, when the program is paused after some
trace t, in fact he does not know t itself. Instead, he knows the equivalence class
[t]∼ that t inhabits, that is the set {t′:T | t ∼ t′}. Note that t itself is in that set:
but it is quite likely not the only member, and the bigger the set is the bigger the
attacker’s ignorance of what actually has occurred in that particular run.
7 That constructs a very simple Kripke model where the accessibility relation is the equivalence that relates
“worlds” indistinguishable to an attacker.
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5 The nature of possible attacks determines reﬁnement
In classical correctness, the aim is to have implementations give the “correct” an-
swer; with nondeterminism, of course there might be many correct answers. But
not all answers should be correct (within the output variable’s type), since other-
wise there’d be no point in running the program. An attack, in the classical sense,
is an attempt to show that an implementation does not meet its aim — thus a
demonstration of an implementation’s having produced an incorrect answer. The
answer is observed in an actual run, and it is shown to be incorrect by examination
of the speciﬁcation’s source code, proving by doing so that the speciﬁcation could
never have delivered that answer. The deﬁnition of reﬁnement is always that if an
implementation fails a test then it must be possible for the speciﬁcation also to fail
that same test. That depends in turn on the deﬁnition of a test, and is what we
deﬁned above for classical sequential correctness.
Taking the two previous paragraphs together, then, we have immediately that
in our context reﬁnement implies that any output value v possible for the imple-
mentation must also be possible for the speciﬁcation. This is of course the classical
reﬁnement relation for nondeterministic programs, excluding h-outputs however be-
cause the attacker cannot see them.
For so-called secure reﬁnement we add a second form of veriﬁcation activity,
this time to do with h. The model of §4 is necessary to formulate it, because that
model is how we captured the idea that an attacker can gather information while
the program is running: by using sequences and the equivalence, we can formulate
his use –at the end of execution– of the information that he gathered along the way.
Here our test is a subset X of h’s type H; the attacker observes the imple-
mentation’s execution and on a particular run, with its particular resolution of
nondeterminism, he ﬁnds he is able to deduce conclusively that the ﬁnal value of h
is in that set X, even though at no stage could he see h itself, and not at the end in
particular. For example (the most elementary), the program h:= 0 is susceptible to
the attack X={0} because the attacker’s examination of the source code is enough
to establish that h∈X ﬁnally: he doesn’t even have to run the program. The pro-
gram h:= 0h:= 1 is susceptible to the same attack, even though h might ﬁnally be
diﬀerent from 0, because on the occasions it is equal to 0 the attacker will know it
because he observed the -branch along the way. The program h:∈{0, 1} is however
not susceptible to the X={0} -attack, because its nondeterminism is atomic and
the attacker cannot observe it: a single step in the debugger takes him directly from
before- to after the statement, and the resolution of “:∈ ” is hidden.
Having deﬁned a test for security, we should be able to ﬁnd a corresponding
deﬁnition of secure reﬁnement to follow. On a particular run, the trace produced
will be ∼-equivalent possibly to a number of others, and the model of §4 has been
constructed so that the h-values found at the ends of all those equivalent traces are
collectively a set H comprising all the values that an attacker must concede h could
possibly have at the end of this run. 8 We call H the shadow of h because, in eﬀect,
8 We are here of course relying on the fact that the constructions in §4 correctly modelled the attackers
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it records the values of h resulting from :∈ -outcomes that could have been taken
on this run, even if in fact they were not.
Taking the two previous paragraphs together, then, we have immediately that
in our context secure reﬁnement implies that for any output shadow HI possible for
the implementation there must be a possible “supporting” output shadow HS for
the speciﬁcation, where supporting means precisely that HS⊆HI . This is exactly
what is needed to establish that for any HI , X with HI⊆X, a successful X-attack
on the implementation, there must also be a successful X-attack possible on the
speciﬁcation: there must also be an output shadow HS with HS⊆X.
Taking the above all together, we have our ﬁrst tentative deﬁnition of secure
reﬁnement in total. Speciﬁcation S is reﬁned by implementation I, written SI as
usual, just when
classical — Any ﬁnal visible v that can be produced by I can also be
produced by S and
secure — Any ﬁnal shadow HI that can be produced by I can be sup-
ported via HS⊆HI by some ﬁnal shadow HS produced by S.
(1)
We will see in a moment that this is actually not yet the right deﬁnition: it needs
to be strengthened. But it is a good ﬁrst step.
6 Compositionality and monotonicity
We saw earlier that compositionality is the property that the meaning of a com-
pound can be deduced from the meanings of its components alone. In some cases
compositionality is not easy to achieve: an informal example is as follows [16].
Parents’ eye colour, on its own, cannot accurately predict the distribution of eye
colour among their children: some brown-eyed parents are virtually certain to
produce brown-eyed children; other brown-eyed parents may produce one blue-
eyed child in four. This means means that if we abstract so severely that equality
between people is (just) equality of their eye-colours, then any programming
language that includes “having children” as one of its language features is not
compositional with respect to that equality.
On the other hand, equality of full genetic proﬁle, though still an abstraction
because it ignores phenotype, is an equality for which having children is composi-
tional (as far as we know). If M,M ′ are twin brothers and F, F ′ twin sisters, then
the children of M+F and the children of M ′+F ′ will have identical distributions
of eye colour (in the limit of very many children) even if M,F love Italian opera
but M ′, F ′ are Goths. The genotype abstracts from taste in music; but it is still
suﬃciently discriminating for eye-colour.
But full genotype is far too discriminating if all we are concerned with is eye-
colour: the ideal situation is one where the equality is as simple as possible while
retaining compositionality. For eye-colour, the crucial idea (Mendel) is “domi-
observational capabilities.
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nant” and “recessive” characteristics (alleles). Two people are equal just when
their eye-colour alleles are the same — and the “operator” for having children is
compositional for that.
The problem with our ﬁrst deﬁnition (1) of reﬁnement is that, although it cor-
rectly captures our focus on secure reﬁnement (cf. our focus on eye-colour), it is not
compositional. We will explore that via a series of examples.
6.1 First example, and consequential adjustment of reﬁnement
Our ﬁrst example concerns the programs h:= 0 and h:∈{0, 1}. According to (1) the
second reﬁnes the ﬁrst: the classical criterion is satisﬁed because the v-output is
in both cases whatever the initial value was; and the security criterion is satisﬁed
because {0}⊆{0, 1}. And yet. . .
Consider the context (· ; v:=h), which produces respectively the programs
h:= 0; v:=h and h:∈{0, 1}; v:=h. The second of those can produce the v-output
1; but the ﬁrst cannot. Thus the second program in context does not reﬁne the
ﬁrst (in that same context). Our informal lesson from this example is that h is
relevant (after all), even though an attacker cannot see it, because it could in a
larger context be assigned subsequently to v which an attacker could then see after
all. So we adjust our deﬁnition of reﬁnement to account for that, getting
classical v — Any ﬁnal visible v that can be produced by I can also be
produced by S,
classical h — Any ﬁnal hidden h that can be produced by I can also be
produced by S and
secure — Any ﬁnal shadow HI that can be produced by I can be sup-
ported via HS⊆HI by some ﬁnal shadow HS produced by S.
(2)
6.2 Second example, and. . .
Our second example concerns h:∈{0, 1}; v:=h and h:∈{0, 1}; v:= 1−h. According
to (our revised) (2) they are equal (i.e. inter-reﬁnable): both produce as output-v’s
of 0 and 1; both produce output-h’s of 0 and 1; and both produce output shadows
of {0} and {1}. Note in the last case the shadows are singleton, not {0, 1} as a
casual inspection of the code’s h:∈{0, 1} might suggest, because the assignment to
v in both cases reveals h. And yet. . .
In this case the context (; v:= v+h) distinguishes the two programs, since the
ﬁrst in context produces v-output of 0 or 2, while the second produces only 1. We
ﬁx that by coupling the attacker’s potential observations of v, h, giving
classical v, h — Any ﬁnal visible v, h that can be produced by I can also
be produced by S and
secure — Any ﬁnal shadow HI that can be produced by I can be sup-
ported via HS⊆HI by some ﬁnal shadow HS produced by S.
(3)
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6.3 Third example. . .
Our third example concerns the programs (v:= 0;h:= 0 1) (v:= 1;h:∈{0, 1}) and
(v:= 0;h:∈{0, 1})  (v:= 1;h:= 0  1) where, to reduce clutter, we are abbreviating
h:= 0h:= 1 as h:= 01 — note therefore that this “syntactic-sugared” assignment
is not atomic. 9 According to (3) the two programs are equal: both produce as
output-(v, h)’s all four possibilities from V×H; and both produce all possible output
shadows, thus {0}, {1} and {0, 1}. And yet. . .
These two are distinguished by the context (; if v=0 then h:∈{0, 1} ﬁ). In the
ﬁrst case the only output shadow is {0, 1}; but in the second case, both {0} and {1}
are still possible. This we ﬁx by coupling all three observations together, giving
hybrid v, h,H — Any ﬁnal triple (v, h,HI) produced by I can be sup-
ported via a triple (v, h,HS), produced by S, with HS⊆HI .(4)
This version of reﬁnement is –ﬁnally– correct; in the next section we explore
how to justify that claim, and what its implications are.
7 Judging reﬁnement’s suitability; inducing a seman-
tics
At the end of the last section we claimed that (4) was “correct.” That means,
ﬁrst of all, that it is suﬃcient to distinguish programs according to our two original
criteria at (1). That is because if two programs diﬀer according to (1) then they
certainly diﬀer according to (4) as well. (If two people have diﬀerent eye-colours,
then certainly they have diﬀerent eye-colour alleles.)
Second, our program contexts are monotonic with respect to (4). This is proved
not by running out of counter-examples in the style of §6, nor by examining all of the
inﬁnitely many possible contexts, but rather by proving that each of the program-
language constructors is monotonic separately, and then concluding inductively that
all ﬁnite contexts built from those constructs are monotonic too. (Here we have an
advantage over Mendel: he cannot proceed by induction to “all possible people.”
Instead our belief in compositionality of alleles rests on a careful observation of the
process.)
The two properties above are essential. Desirable is as well is a third property
that our reﬁnement deﬁnition is as simple as possible. (The above two properties can
be understood to be saying “. . . but not too simple.”) To show the optional property
of simplicity we argue that if any programs are distinguished by our sophisticated
(4) then there is a context within which they can in fact be distinguished by our
original (1). (Alleles are as simple as it gets for explaining eye-colour if for any
two people M,M ′ with diﬀerent eye-colour alleles we can ﬁnd a single F such that
M+F and M ′+F can yield diﬀerent child-distributions of actual eye-colour.)
Thus suppose that program I yields a triple (vˆ, hˆ, HI) but there is no HS⊆HI
such that program S yields a triple (vˆ, hˆ, HS). We conclude from (4) that S  I.
How do we convince ourselves that that is a distinction worth making?
9 That is, our syntactic convention is that h:∈{0, 1} is atomic but h:= 0  1 is not.
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The program-in-context (I; if v =vˆ ∨ h=hˆ then h:∈H ﬁ) can produce a shadow
HI , by assumption; but the matching (S; if v =vˆ ∨ h=hˆ then h:∈H ﬁ) cannot pro-
duce a supporting HS⊆HI , which shows it is indeed worth distinguishing according
to our original criterion (1). (The point of the if. . . is to “smother” the other (v, h)-
outputs of S so that they cannot supply the needed supporting HS . 10 )
With our reﬁnement deﬁnition now secured, we induce our programs’
semantics, given an initial state, to be just the set of attacks that can suc-
ceed against it. This is the standard approach, ideal when it can be applied,
because then reﬁnement boils down to simple reverse-inclusion of those sets:
if S  I then any attack that succeeds against I must (potentially) succeed
against S. Because our semantics has the optional simplicity-property, we
can say that it is fully abstract.
(5)
8 Distilling the essence of traces leaves The Shadow
Semantics
The model of §3 was chosen subjectively, 11 being made comprehensive enough to
reﬂect the informal (but crucial) issues discovered in the preliminary experiments
of §2. In fact it contains far more information than we need (like a genotype).
The subsequent analyses of §§5–7, and in particular the ﬁnal deﬁnition of re-
ﬁnement (4), determined for us just what information we needed to keep (alleles)
and, by implication, what we could throw away. With that, and with (5) in mind,
we determine the semantics of a command by taking an initial state, generating
all traces (§3), calculating the equivalence (§4), keeping only the triples (v, h,H)
that we need for compositionality of reﬁnement (4), and “up-closing” in the third,
shadow component, because if an attack “I think h is in X” succeeds, then so will
any (other) attack X ′ with X⊆X ′. Thus a command P ’s semantics [[P ]] is of type
V→H→PH → P(V×H×PH), with the “P” on the output side reﬂecting possible
nondeterminism, 12 and an up-closure condition that if (v′, h′, H ′) ∈ [[P ]].v.h.H and
H ′⊆H ′′, then also (v′, h′, H ′′) ∈ [[P ]].v.h.H.
And now, ﬁnally, we can say that a speciﬁcation S is reﬁned by an imple-
mentation I just when for all v, h,H in their types we have [[S]].v.h.H ⊇
[[I]].v.h.H .
(6)
Here are some examples. Let the type H of h be {0, 1, 2} and consider the
program h:∈{0, 1}  h:∈{1, 2} which, seen more closely, becomes
[p0] ([p1] h:∈{0, 1} [p2])  ([p3] h:∈{1, 2} [p4]) [p5] .
10A special case is when HI is all of H, where our smothering trick fails; but then program S can have no
(vˆ, hˆ, HS) output at all. So we use the classical context (; if v=vˆ ∧ h=hˆ then v:= 1 else v:= 0 ﬁ) which
sets v to 0 after executing S; after I however v can be set to 1.
11That is, we have only a subjective notion of its being the right one: there is no rigorous way we can prove
that.
12This is eﬀectively the same as (V×H×PH) → P(V×H×PH), but the “spread-out” Curried arguments
generate less parenthesis-clutter in use. Another familiar alternative is (V×H×PH)↔ (V×H×PH); but this
makes it messier to state the healthiness conditions subsequently.
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with the bracketed notations being program-counter values. From initial state
(v0, h0, p0) this generates the four traces
〈(v0, h0, p0), (v0, h0, p1), (v0, 0, p2), (v0, 0, p5)〉 , in equivalence class A, say
〈(v0, h0, p0), (v0, h0, p1), (v0, 1, p2), (v0, 1, p5)〉 , also in class A
〈(v0, h0, p0), (v0, h0, p3), (v0, 1, p4), (v0, 1, p5)〉 , in class B
〈(v0, h0, p0), (v0, h0, p3), (v0, 2, p4), (v0, 2, p5)〉 , in class B
with two ∼-equivalence classes A,B as indicated. If now we “distil the essence,” by
keeping only the ﬁnal (v, h) values while retaining the equivalence, we get
(v0, 0) in class A
(v0, 1) in class A
(v0, 1) in class B
(v0, 2) in class B ,
where the relation is no longer an equivalence (but it doesn’t matter), because we
have thrown away some information and thus have lost transitivity. This gives for
our one-and-only initial v-value v0 the two H-sets –the two shadows–
{0, 1} and {1, 2}
which (interestingly enough) are not disjoint. Thus our program produces from the
given initial state four “minimal” ﬁnal-state triples plus three others generated by
up-closure:
(v0, 0, {0, 1})
(v0, 1, {0, 1})
(v0, 1, {1, 2})
(v0, 2, {1, 2})
and
(v0, 0, {0, 1, 2})
(v0, 1, {0, 1, 2})
(v0, 2, {0, 1, 2})
(7)
If we concentrate on the minimal (left-hand) triples in (7), we learn that after
observing the above program an attacker will either know that h is in {0, 1} or he
will know that it is in {1, 2} even though before the program runs he will not know
which of those things he will later know: in that sense they are “unknown knowns.”
In other words, at the beginning of the run he cannot predict the resolution of
the ﬁrst nondeterminism  ; but by the end of the run he will have seen which
way it went. Nevertheless, which ever way that was, he will not have seen how the
immediately following :∈ was resolved (in either case) — but he will know, from the
source code and single-stepping, over which set (either {0, 1} or {1, 2}) that second
resolution occurred.
The right-hand triples, generated by closure, tell us that whatever happens the
attacker will know that h is in {0, 1, 2}.
We see here, incidentally, the role of atomicity: an atomic command (like
C. Morgan / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 259 (2009) 123–141 133
h:∈{0, 1}) has a single entry and exit and –even if the command contains
nondeterminism– a single-stepping attacker will be taken straight from its entry
to its exit, observing nothing about the choice taken along the way.
9 Healthiness conditions
In the previous section (§8) we ﬁnally managed to distil a “lean” semantics (sets
of triples) from the operationally motivated guesswork (§3) with which we began.
In order that reﬁnement could be simple reverse subset-inclusion, we included the
up-closure requirement, a so-called “healthiness condition” on the sets of outputs
we are prepared to consider; it was motivated by the notion that if a given attack
succeeds, then so should any stronger attack. Thus although the space of program
results, the “square type,” is P(V×H×PH), we do not consider all possible sets (i.e.
elements of the powerset) to be healthy: only the up-closed ones are. 13
That technique of up-closure is a very common feature of program semantics. For
example, in sequential relational semantics S→PS⊥ modelling both nontermination
(with ⊥) and nondeterminism (with P), it is conventional to “ﬂuﬀ-up” the output
sets so that if ⊥ is in the set, so is every other element of the state-space S. This is
simply up-closure over the ﬂat domain S⊥ where s1  s2 just when s1=⊥=s2. 14
Similarly in sequential and probabilistic relational semantics [9,19,14], where the
output sets contain subdistributions Δ over S, up-closure requires that if subdistri-
bution Δ can be produced by a program and we have Δ<Δ′, then we consider also
Δ′ to be produced (potentially) by that program. 15
Finally, in the failures model of CSP a process is considered to be a set of trace-
failure pairs (s,X), the attack in this case being the claim that “after trace s the
oﬀer X can be refused.” Clearly in that case also (s,X ′) can be refused whenever
X ′⊆X, and so the refusal sets are down-closed — which is indeed up-closed if you
are upside-down.
In all three cases, reﬁnement is reverse subset-inclusion (5), the eﬀect –and
indeed the point– of using up-closure.
But up-closure is not always used, and thus reﬁnement is not always as simple
as reverse subset-inclusion. Nevertheless it is always equivalent to that, if you look
at things in a certain way; it’s just that sometimes looking at things in another way
is more convenient.
A well known example eschewing up-closure is the Z-schema [8], whose type
13Encouraged by a referee, I tracked this possibly unfamiliar term down with the help of Bernard Sufrin
(email Sep. ’09). He wrote that the term square sets was coined by Abrial (∼1981) to mean those “freely
constructed” from givens with product and power only. These are the “essentials” from within which all
other describable sets were “separated” by predicates.
(It’s an informal, descriptive notion, not intended (e.g.) to compete with the cumulative hierarchy.)
14More precisely, it is the Smyth powerdomain-order on PS⊥ generated from the underlying ﬂat order on
S⊥ itself [21]. Fluﬃng-up’s being a speciﬁc instance of the general Smyth-technique is the reason it works
so well.
15A subdistribution sums to no more than one, rather than to one exactly: any deﬁcit represents the
probability of nontermination (abort). Thus when Δ<Δ′ the greater subdistribution assigns at least the
same probability to all proper outcomes, and strictly less probability to abort [19,14].
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(interpreting the predicate as a relation) is S↔S with S being the set denoted by
the signature. For Z{1,2} ∈ S↔S we have Z1Z2 just when
dom.Z1 ⊆ dom.Z2 ∧ (dom.Z1)Z2 ⊆ Z1 .
That’s certainly more complicated than reverse subset-inclusion; but avoiding ex-
plicit mention of ⊥ is simpler for speciﬁcations, one of Z’s primary purposes.
Another example where up-closure is not used is weakest preconditions, whose
semantic space is PS→PS taking post-conditions to the weakest preconditions that
guarantee them: it is not the case that wp.P.post = pre and pre′⇒ pre implies
wp.P.post = pre′ as well, although clearly in this case the up-closure is extremely
close by. (Think of Hoare triples.)
We too will abandon up-closure, for reasons to do with another form of health-
iness condition; but what we are going to do will be equivalent to what we have
already done. (That is, we are not going to alter our deﬁnition of reﬁnement any
further.)
Weakest preconditions have a healthiness condition conjunctivity, that for two
postconditions post{1,2} we have wp.P.(post1 ∧ post2) = wp.P.post1 ∧ wp.P.post2 —
and this is because they are constructed from the underlying, and more operational
relational semantics. For a relational program (semantics) r ∈ S → S⊥ we deﬁne
wp.r.post to be {s:S ·
(
∀s′:S | s′∈r.s · s′∈post
)
}, where here we are interpreting
predicate post as the subset of S it denotes. Now wp.r is of type PS → PS, as it
should be; but function wp is itself not surjective. That is, the image of the set
S → S⊥ through the function wp is exactly the subset of PS → PS containing the
conjunctive functions only, and that is not all of them. Thus this kind of healthiness
condition is (paradoxically) a “scar” left over from the way in which the semantic
denotation was constructed (in this case, via the wp function). The “sub-linearity”
of probabilistic predicate transformers is exactly the same kind of scar [19,14].
In fact there are two scars left by the way in which we construct the Shadow
Semantics (of triples) from the operational semantics (of traces). The ﬁrst is that
in any output triple (v, h,H) we must have h∈H, because the equivalence relation
∼, from which the shadow H was constructed, is reﬂexive. That is (A) the actual
value of h must be one of the potential values the attacker considers to be possible.
The second is that if (v, h,H) is a possible output-triple, and we have h′∈H for
some (other) h′, then also (v, h′, H) must be a possible output triple. That is (B)
a reasonable attacker will never consider h′ to be a possibility unless inspection of
the source-code shows that the program could actually produce it.
Note that the explanations (A,B) are not the causes of the two healthiness
conditions: the cause is that the process of distilling triples from traces (§8) is not
surjective onto P(V×H×PH). The explanations are only post-hoc “sanity checks”
that we are still heading in the right direction. The two conditions are that for any
output-set R:= [[P ]].v.h.H of triples we must have that
(A) reﬂexivity If (v′, h′, H ′) ∈ R then h′∈H ′.
(B) necessity If (v′, h′, H ′) ∈ R and h′′∈H ′ then also (v′, h′′, H ′) ∈ R.(8)
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It is because of the necessity condition that we should drop up-closure. If in
Example (7) the type H had been bigger, say {0, 1, 2, 3}, then up-closure would
add triples like (v0, 0, {0, 1, 2, 3}) which in respect of the potential h-value 3 violates
necessity: there is no other triple (v0, 3, {0, 1, 2, 3}). And indeed there should not
be one, because the program cannot assign 3 to h under any circumstances.
Note the deﬁnition (4) of reﬁnement has not changed; it is just that once we
drop up-closure it is no longer conveniently equivalent to reverse subset-inclusion.
We give the importance of necessity (8) a higher priority.
10 Some interesting examples
The point of working out a semantics carefully, especially in a new and unfamiliar
domain, is that it clariﬁes and instructs your intuition in situations where that
intuition might be somewhat stretched. Especially enjoyable are program-pairs
that are “obviously” diﬀerent, yet the semantics says they are the same, or pairs
that are “obviously” the same but the semantics says they diﬀer. In this section we
present a few of those.
10.1 The Encryption Lemma, and Speciﬁcation Statements
What we call the Encryption Lemma is based on properties of exclusive-or ⊕: it is
that in the context of a global hidden Boolean hid h the local block
|[ vis v′;hid h′; h′:∈{0, 1}; v′:=h⊕h′ ]|(9)
is equivalent to skip — it changes nothing; and it reveals nothing. This is not
surprising: a coin h is (already) hidden; a second temporary hidden coin h′ is
introduced and ﬂipped; and it is published in v′ whether the two coins show the same
face. Obviously that reveals nothing about the original coin h since the temporary
coin h′ is hidden and, indeed, thrown away at the end of the local block.
This idiom is used so often (e.g. in both the Dining Cryptographers [3,17] and
the Oblivious Transfer [20,18]) that it’s nice to have a concise notation for it; and so
we write (v′⊕h′):=h for the contents of the block, an abbreviation for a speciﬁcation
statement [15] or a generalised substitution [1]:
v′, h′:[v′⊕h′ = h]
or ANY v1, h1 WHERE v1⊕h1 = h THEN v′, h′:= v1, h1 END .
That is, we set v′ and h′, nondeterministically, so that their exclusive-or equals h;
and that nondeterminism is hidden, because this command is atomic.
The interesting issue is what such speciﬁcation statements mean in general when
hidden variables are involved: we could, after all, decompose our example speciﬁ-
cation statement in the complementary way to (9), giving
|[ vis v′;hid h′; v′:∈{0, 1};h′:=h⊕v′ ]| .(10)
Here the nondeterminism is visible, because it’s being applied to visible v′, and an
attacker can see v′ even though it’s local. In fact our semantics identiﬁes v′:∈{0, 1}
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and v′:= 0  1 when v′ is visible, whether local or not.
The question is then whether (9) and (10) really are equal. They should be, by
transitivity of equality since they are both decompositions of (v′⊕h′):=h. On the
other hand, in (9) the nondeterminism is hidden, yet in (10) it’s visible. Obviously
that means they are diﬀerent — but in fact they are the same. 16
10.2 Revelations, and “eﬀectively visible” values
The revelation command reveal E publishes the value of E for all to see, but
changes no variable in doing so: it’s equivalent by deﬁnition to the local block
|[ vis v; v:=E ]|. We say that a value E is eﬀectively visible at a point in a
program just when adding a statement reveal E at that point does not change the
program’s meaning [13]. If in particular a hidden h is eﬀectively visible at some
point, then in reasoning about the program at that point we can treat h as if it
were declared visible (instead of hidden, as it actually was declared).
Thus for example hidden variable h is eﬀectively visible at  in the program frag-
ment v:=h  because the two programs v:=h and v:=h; reveal h are equal. That’s
no surprise. But it is also true that the two programs v:=h and reveal h; v:=h are
equal, and so do we conclude that h is eﬀectively visible at  in  v:=h? Obviously
variable h is not eﬀectively visible before it has been assigned to v — but in fact it
is.
10.3 Eﬀective visibility and nondeterminism
Let’s accept h’s eﬀective visibility at  in  v:=h — perhaps reasoning that, although
the attacker does not actually know h at the time  is reached, he can reason as if
he does simply by waiting one more command before he starts drawing conclusions
retrospectively about the program state at it was at  (now in the past). It makes
no diﬀerence when those conclusions are drawn, and the eventual release of h is
inevitable: the statement v:=h cannot be avoided.
With that in mind, we exercise the semantics a bit more by asking about
 (v:=h  skip). Is h eﬀectively visible this time? After all, it is no longer cer-
tain that it will be revealed by the assignment, since the skip command might be
executed instead. Nevertheless, since  is demonic we should conclude the worst,
that h is eﬀectively visible, simply because the demon might make it so. That
depends –by deﬁnition– on the equality of the two fragments v:=h  skip and
reveal h; (v:=h  skip) — and obviously they are equal, for the reasons just men-
tioned. But in fact they are not.
10.4 Local blocks and cover-ups
As our last example we modify the previous one by making v local: is h eﬀectively
visible in  |[ vis v; v:=h skip ]|? Obviously making v local has no eﬀect, since it
16This might not surprise everyone; but it surprised us. Unfortunately you can’t surprise all of the people
all of the time.
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can be seen regardless of the fact that its having held h’s value is “covered-up” when
it is discarded at the end of the local block. (Locality has no eﬀect on visibility.)
But in fact h is eﬀectively visible in this example, even though in §10.3 it was not.
11 Conclusion: Meta Formal Methods
We’ve told a story about constructing a reﬁnement order and a model for non-
interference in sequential programs. Naturally it didn’t actually happen that way.
But in telling the story we are just doing Formal Methods “one level up.”
The same story-telling occurs in the careful construction of computer programs,
especially ones made using Formal Methods. There are many mistakes and blind
alleys, and however much we would like to believe that a program is developed
hand-in-hand with its proof via inexorable steps that are never undone, in practice
the only “never” is that such developments almost never happen.
What we do aim for in Formal Methods is to set our standards of reasoning so
high that we will be able to invent a story, afterwards, of how the program might
have been constructed in that inexorable way if only we had been clever enough.
This is not for us to convince others of how smart we are — rather it is to allow
others to convince themselves that we have not been stupid.
What we have done in this note is of exactly that same type, and serves the
same purpose except that it in this case we are constructing not a program but a
formal method itself. Our story is an example of Meta Formal Methods.
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A Epilogue: an even leaner semantics, and its derived
reﬁnement order
The healthiness conditions (8) mean that the h component of our triples is redun-
dant: keeping just (v,H) -pairs is equivalent. To get from triples to pairs, obviously
we just project the h away. In the other direction, from a set of pairs P we deduce
uniquely the set of triples R it must have come from via
R = addHid.P := {v, h,H | (v,H)∈P ∧ h∈H} .
Because of reﬂexivity (8), this construction addHid does not miss any triples; because
of necessity it doesn’t add too many. The type of programs’ semantics would then
become the simpler V→PH→P(V×PH); but of course the reﬁnement relation would
have to change.
Luckily we do not have to torture ourselves by inventing the pair-appropriate
reﬁnement relation 2 all over again from ﬁrst principles, retracing the long route
for the triple-appropriate relation 3 (call it) that we ﬁnally deﬁned at (4). Instead
we simply say that P 2 P ′ just when addHid.P 3 addHid.P ′.
We can work out the deﬁnition of 2 by calculation. Writing Pv for the projec-
tion {H · (v,H)∈P}, we have
P 2 P ′
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iﬀ addHid.P 3 addHid.P ′ “deﬁnition 
2”
iﬀ {v, h,H | H∈Pv ∧ h∈H} 3 {v, h,H | H∈P ′v ∧ h∈H} “deﬁnition addHid”
iﬀ “deﬁnition 
3”(
∀v, h,H ′ | H ′∈P ′v ∧ h∈H ′ ·
(
∃H | H∈Pv · h∈H ∧H⊆H ′
) )
iﬀ “rearrange quantiﬁers”(




∃H | H∈Pv · h∈H ∧H⊆H ′
)))
iﬀ for all v we have
(
∀h∈H ′:P ′v ·
(
∃H:Pv · h∈H⊆H ′
))
, “compact”
which means that for every v, each set in P ′v must be the union of some collection
of sets occurring in Pv.
This reﬁnement relation 2 is not as simple as 3 because each pair in the
implementation could potentially need support from a collection of pairs in the
speciﬁcation (a collection whose HS components’ union equals the single HI in
question). On the other hand, if we impose a single healthiness condition of union-
closure on the pairs, the reﬁnement relation becomes reverse subset-inclusion again
and –furthermore– we can retain that union-closure because there are no other
healthiness conditions for it to conﬂict with.
Part of the intuitive appeal of the union-closure deﬁnition is that replacing two
shadows H{1,2} by a single shadow H1∪H2 is exactly what happens when we replace
a visible choice  by a hidden choice :∈ so that e.g. h:= 0 1, with its two shadows
{0} and {1}, reﬁnes to h:∈{0, 1} with its single shadow {0, 1}. 17
Thus ()  (:∈ ) is the “essence” of security reﬁnement.
Perhaps this is simpler overall?
As a ﬁnal example, we ask whether h:∈{0, 1}  h:∈{2, 3} is reﬁned by
h:∈{0, 1, 2}. Obviously it is, because the potential h-outputs on the right are in-
cluded in those on the left, and the Shadow on the right contains one of those on
the left.
Using triples, we ﬁnd nevertheless that it is not, because triple (v0, 2, {0, 1, 2})
on the right has no support on the left: on the one hand, neither (v0, 0, {0, 1}) nor
(v0, 1, {0, 1}) will do because, although {0, 1} ⊆ {0, 1, 2}, their h-components 0,1 do
not include 2; on the other hand, (v0, 2, {2, 3}) will not do because {2, 3} ⊆ {0, 1, 2}.
Using pairs we ﬁnd that, although {0, 1, 2} is a subset of the union of shadows
{0, 1} ∪ {2, 3}, it is not the union exactly. Thus the views agree (as they should):
the reﬁnement fails either way.
17 It also suggests a normal form for secure programs: all visible demonic choices are taken ﬁrst, then hidden
choices and then, ﬁnally, deterministic program fragments.
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B Brief comments on the interesting examples
B.1 On §10.1
Operationally, the ﬁrst formulation (9) seems secure because it involves an act whose
outcome is unpredictable (the ﬂip) and whose result we cannot see (the coin h′ is
concealed). All that happens in the second formulation (10) is that the emphasis
is placed on the hiding (the ﬁnal assignment to h′ is pointless, since it is hidden
and local), and we see that the burden of unpredictability is shifted to the secret h.
Either way, we learn nothing.
B.2 On §10.2
Here the confusion is introduced by the informal use of English: of course h is not
actually visible at that earlier point; but the attacker is not obliged to reason in
real time. He can just take a whole slew of observations and puzzle them out at
his leisure. The point is that he can deduce the value h had at the point indicated,
even if that deduction is later.
B.3 On §10.3
The diﬀerence between v:=h skip and reveal h; (v:=h skip) is seen by consid-
ering the two programs in a larger context: we compare
h:∈H−{v}; v:=h  skip; if v=h then h:∈H ﬁ
and h:∈H−{v}; reveal h; (v:=h  skip); if v=h then h:∈H ﬁ .
The leading statement puts us in a context where we know that h and v diﬀer, but
that is all; the trailing statement tries to detect the escape of h’s value into v, via
the test v=h, and executes a “cover up” command h:∈H if necessary.
We can now see that the second program is worse than the ﬁrst, because it
releases h’s value and (demonically) still escapes detection. The ﬁrst program can-
not escape detection, and the cover-up code ensures that either way we know little
about h at its conclusion.
B.4 On §10.4
This last example highlights the diﬀerence between the attacker and the program-
mer. In App. B.3 we saw that the possible escape of h via the command v:=h could
be compensated for by defensive programming subsequently: it is as if the “thief”
of h’s value left muddy footprints by altering v’s value in the process; and those
footprints can be tested for later with program code.
But if v is local, then the thief’s footprints are left in snow — which melts at
the end of the block. There is no defensive programming subsequently that can
detect whether h escaped and so, this time, we must indeed assume the worst: that
(demonically) the v:=h was executed and not the skip.
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